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Abstract: This paper criticizes the claim that fair trade entails a commitment to an ideal of formal 
equality according to which all members of the trade regime are to receive and offer equal, or 
uniform, treatment. The first section elaborates upon the idea of formal equality and its 
rationales, identifies several positive arguments for departing from formal equality, and responds 
to a number of objections to “special and differential treatment” for poor countries. Next, in 
section II, the paper considers in more detail one specific element of formal equality in the trade 
regime, namely, the principle of reciprocity. Three distinct reciprocity principles are identified, 
none of which, it is argued, should be regarded as a requirement of fairness. Section III considers 
a more recent interpretation of formal equality which requires trading countries to “harmonize” 
domestic laws and policies. It is argued that harmonization is not required by fairness. 
Keywords: Fair Trade; Global Justice; World Trade Organization; Formal Equality; Special and 
Differential Treatment; Reciprocity; Harmonization 
 
It is sometimes said that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is, in one respect, fundamentally 
egalitarian. It is fundamentally egalitarian in the sense that it is committed to an ideal of formal 
equality according to which all member states are to receive and offer equal, or uniform, 
treatment. This commitment to formal equality is expressed in various ways. It is expressed, for 
example, in the principle of non-discrimination (embodied in the Most Favoured Nation and 
National Treatment rules) and the principle of reciprocity. The Most Favoured Nation rule 
(MFN) requires WTO member states to refrain from treating any members less favourably than 
they treat others. If a state offers a privilege (e.g. a tariff concession) to another state, it must 
extend that privilege to all WTO members. The National Treatment rule (NT) requires states to 
refrain from treating imports less favourably than they treat domestically produced goods; once 
foreign goods have passed customs and entered the domestic market, the taxes and regulations 
which apply to them must not differ from those applied to domestically produced goods. And 
the principle of reciprocity requires states to match the liberalization efforts of others; if, during a 
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round of negotiations, one state promises to cut tariffs by x per cent, other states are also 
expected to cut tariffs by x per cent. The commitment to formal equality is also expressed in the 
WTO’s egalitarian and majoritarian voting system. 
 Formal equality has been championed by developed countries, but it has been challenged 
by poorer members of the trade regime. Throughout the trade regime’s history, developing 
countries have demanded various forms of preferential treatment – often referred to as “special 
and differential treatment” (SDT)1 – and their demands have sometimes been acceded to.2 For 
example, Part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was added in 
1965, restricts the application of the reciprocity principle to developed countries, and the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), initiated in 1968, permits developed countries to 
deviate from MFN by imposing lower tariffs on imports from developing countries. Also, 
developing countries have sometimes enjoyed the freedom to refrain from signing agreements 
which they felt were not in their interest. During the Tokyo Round of negotiations, for example, 
many developing countries were able to refrain from signing a number of agreements on 
reducing the incidence of non-tariff barriers. In recent years, new forms of SDT have been 
mooted – including technology transfers from developed to developing countries, and payments 
to help the latter implement obligations and to build their negotiating capacity – but opponents 
of SDT have not gone away. 
This paper considers whether we have moral reasons to endorse formal equality within 
the trade regime, and pays particular attention to the relationship between formal equality, on the 
one hand, and fairness or justice, on the other. The thrust of my argument is that formal equality, 
                                                          
1 On SDT see, for example, Christopher Stevens, “Special and Differential Treatment”, in Ivan Mbirimi, Bridget 
Chilala, and Roman Grynberg (eds.) From Doha to Cancun: Delivering a Development Round (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2003); Alexander Keck and Patrick Low, “Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When, 
and How?”, in Simon Evenett and Bernard M. Hoekman (eds.) Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade 
3rd Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2005) Ch. 15. 
2 See Chin Leng Lim, “The Conventional Morality of Trade”, in Chios Carmody et al. (eds.), Global Justice and 
International Economic Law: Opportunities and Prospects (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
3 
 
as that idea has been interpreted and applied in the context of trade, is not an ideal to which we 
should aspire. But, as will become clear, the issue cannot be fully resolved through philosophical 
analysis alone. The paper is structured as follows. The first section elaborates upon the idea of 
formal equality and its rationales, identifies several positive arguments for departing from formal 
equality, and responds to a number of objections to SDT. Next, in section II, I consider in more 
detail one specific element of formal equality in the trade regime, namely, the principle of 
reciprocity. Three distinct reciprocity principles are identified, none of which, it is argued, should 
be regarded as a requirement of fairness. Section III considers a more recent interpretation of 
formal equality which requires trading countries to “harmonize” domestic laws and policies. I 
argue that harmonization is not required by fairness. 
In recent decades, notions of fair and just trade have become increasingly widespread. 
Trade representatives, worker’s organizations, corporations, and various NGOs have advanced a 
variety of ideas about what fairness in trade requires. Slowly but surely, philosophers have begun 
to participate in this debate. They have addressed questions such as: (i) what can be traded, and 
with whom?3; (ii) should trade be restricted in order to, say, protect jobs or preserve cultural 
distinctiveness?4; and (iii) should the national income gains created by trade be distributed 
according to a certain (e.g. egalitarian) pattern?5 This paper addresses important aspects of the 
fair trade debate which have not yet received adequate philosophical scrutiny. 
I 
Formal Equality and Preferential Treatment 
                                                          
3 For one aspect of this debate see James Christensen, “Weapons, Security, and Oppression: A Normative Study of 
International Arms Transfers”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2015. 
4 Mathias Risse, “Fairness in trade I: obligations from trading and the pauper-labor argument”, Politics, Philosophy & 
Economics, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007; Malgorzata Kurjanska and Matthias Risse, “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and 
the Fair Trade Movement”, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008; Fernando R. Teson, “Why Free 
Trade is Required by Justice”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2012. 
5 Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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Is formal equality within the trade regime desirable? Should we heed calls to abolish SDT, or 
seek to maintain and extend it? We can start to answer these questions by examining in more 
detail the idea of formal equality and the considerations which support it. Note that formal 
equality is an ambiguous concept. It is used to refer both to the claim that (i) all individuals (or all 
members of a particular practice) must receive equal (uniform, identical) treatment6, and to the 
claim that (ii) all individuals (or all members a particular practice) who are comparable in relevant 
respects must receive equal (uniform, identical) treatment – that is, to the principle that like cases 
should be treated alike.7 Given that any statement of (ii) presupposes an account of which 
respects are relevant, (ii) can easily collapse into (i). Suppose a university claims to adhere to the 
principle that like cases should be treated alike. And suppose that individuals are deemed to be 
alike provided that they are a member of the university. It follows that the university’s policy of 
treating like cases alike is indistinguishable from a policy of treating all members identically. 
One might say that when developed members of the trade regime champion the idea of 
formal equality, they are championing the idea that like cases should be treated alike. But, to the 
degree that this is true, the developed country advocates of formal equality have worked with an 
implicit account of relevant respects according to which member states and their citizens are not 
deemed to be unalike by virtue of differential levels of economic development. The developing 
countries and their citizens may be poorer than the developed countries and developed-country 
citizens, but both sets of countries, and both sets of citizens, are deemed to be alike in all 
respects that are relevant, and it is said that they should therefore receive, and be expected to 
offer, uniform treatment. 
Formal equality within the trade regime might be endorsed for a variety of pragmatic 
reasons: when expectations are uniform it may be easier for states to identify what is required of 
                                                          
6 See, for example, Patricia Hughes “Recognizing Substantive Equality as a Foundational Constitutional Principle”, 
Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 5, 1999, p. 27; Lim, op.cit. 
7 See, for example, Charles Frankel, “Equality of Opportunity”, Ethics, Vol. 81, No. 3, 1971, pp. 193-194; Catherine 
Barnard and Bob Hepple, “Substantive Equality”, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2000, pp. 562-564. 
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them; uniform rules are easier to administer and enforce; and uniform rules might facilitate the 
process of trade liberalization. Formal equality might also be defended for reasons of equity. 
Departures from formal equality often confer advantages upon one set of individuals, and if all 
individuals are deemed to be alike in relevant respects the conferral of such advantages can be 
seen as unfair. If there are no relevant differences among individuals, there can be no grounds 
for treating one set differently and more favourably than others. The problem with this argument 
when applied in the context of trade is that it is very difficult to defend the claim that all 
members of the trade regime are alike in relevant respects. More specifically, the claim that 
differential levels of economic development do not constitute a relevant difference is highly 
suspect. Indeed, the fact that some members of the trade regime are very poor might be thought 
to give us a strong prima facie reason to depart from formal equality, and to advocate 
preferential treatment for poorer states. 
The case for departing from formal equality and offering special and differential 
treatment to poor countries can be given several more specific rationales. First, one might 
advocate SDT on the grounds that it enables wealthy states to discharge positive duties of 
assistance to the global poor. Many philosophers have defended the claim that citizens of 
affluent countries have positive duties to contribute to the alleviation of global poverty, at least 
when they can do so at little cost to themselves, and one might argue that SDT provides an 
opportunity to discharge such duties.8 Alternatively, one might advocate SDT on the grounds 
that it enables wealthy states to discharge rectificatory duties; that is, duties to compensate for 
the infliction of harm. According to some critics, rich countries are guilty not (or not merely) of 
failing to discharge positive duties to help the poor, but of violating negative duties to refrain 
from harming them. Scholars and activists who take this view hold that rich countries are 
implicated in the poor’s plight. Colonial practices have inflicted long-lasting damage on poor 
                                                          
8 The classic defence of positive duties to alleviate poverty is Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1972. 
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countries, and the contemporary global order is structured in a way that continues to undermine 
their development prospects.9 If rich countries are guilty as charged, their primary duty must be 
to stop inflicting harm. But they will also have duties to compensate for harms they have already 
caused. SDT might, then, be justified as a way of discharging those rectificatory duties: giving 
poor countries extra now might be seen as a way of making up for what the rich have taken in 
the past. In order for these two arguments to go through, one would have to show not only that 
SDT is, in fact, an effective tool for discharging positive and rectificatory duties, but also that 
there are not acceptable alternatives which do not involve deviations from formal equality. 
SDT might also be defended on the grounds that it is necessary to ensure an equitable 
distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with participation in the trade regime. 
Egalitarian theory has long recognized that, because people differ in important respects, equal (or 
uniform) rights may be insufficient to secure genuine equality. This line of reasoning can be used 
to support SDT. Given the huge differences between the abilities and needs of developed and 
developing countries, a set of rules with which the former can easily comply might be excessively 
demanding for the latter. Complying with WTO rules is often more demanding for poor 
countries. This is for a variety of reasons: poor countries have weaker safety nets, and are thus 
less able to protect workers displaced by trade liberalization; their administrative systems typically 
require greater reform; and implementing trade agreements requires expenditure of resources 
which could otherwise be spent on development programmes.10 It can therefore be argued that 
differential treatment is appropriate as it can ensure a more equal and equitable distribution of 
benefits and burdens. 
                                                          
9 Thomas Pogge’s oeuvre offers the most sophisticated statement of this view. See, for example, Thomas Pogge 
World Poverty and Human Rights: Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). For a helpful overview of the literature 
on the effects of colonial practices on economic development, see Nathan Nunn, “The Importance of History for 
Economic Development”, Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 1, 2009. 
10 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), Chapter 13. 
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Each of the arguments briefly sketched above provides resources with which to justify 
departures from formal equality, and vindicate preferential treatment for poor countries. But 
they might be countered with a variety of objections, to which we should now turn. 
Objections 
It might be argued that SDT (i) undermines the bargaining power of poor countries; (ii) is unfair; 
or (iii) directly harms the economies of poor countries. Let us consider these three objections in 
turn. 
1. Diminished Bargaining Power 
It is sometimes argued that SDT is counter-productive because it undermines the bargaining 
power of the poor. According to this argument, poor countries will only be granted access to 
important markets in the developed world if they offer rich countries something in return. But 
SDT permits and encourages poor countries to offer few concessions, and, consequently, they 
receive little from the rich. The objection is well articulated by Peter Lichtenbaum, who writes: 
Developing countries have been unable to obtain significant concessions on products of interest 
to them from developed economies by failing to participate in the exchange of reciprocal 
reductions in trade barriers. For example, industrialized countries singled out textiles and 
agriculture, which are important products for developing countries, and subjected these 
industries to extremely high import restrictions… [T]he long-term interests of developing 
countries may be better served if they were able to improve their negotiating position by offering 
to liberalize their economies and open their markets to import competition. In this way, 
developing countries could bargain more effectively to obtain market access on products of 
interest to their economies.11 
                                                          
11 Peter Lichtenbaum, ““Special Treatment” vs. “Equal Participation:” Striking A Balance In The Doha 
Negotiations”, The American University International Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2002, pp. 1017-1018, footnote omitted. 
Cf. Constantine Michalopoulos, “Developing Country Strategies for the Millennium Round”, Journal of World Trade, 
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 It is important to be clear about what it being said here. The claim is not that SDT directly 
or necessarily hurts the interests of poor countries. Rather, the claim is that when poor countries 
avail themselves of the opportunities made available by SDT, rich countries react in a particular 
way – namely, they single out products of special importance to poor countries and impose upon 
those products inordinately high tariffs. Rich countries give with one hand – by acceding to 
demands for SDT – but take away with the other. Now, it should be obvious that the argument 
currently under scrutiny – SDT should be abandoned because it hurts the interests of the poor – 
cannot be made in good faith by rich members of the WTO. The rich cannot object to SDT on 
the grounds that it is bad for the poor if it is their own voluntary actions which make it bad for 
the poor. As G. A. Cohen famously pointed out, 
an argument changes its aspect when its presenter is the person, or one of the people, whose 
choice, or choices, make one or more of the argument’s premises true. By contrast with other 
presenters of the same argument, a person who makes, or helps to make, one of its premises true 
can be asked to justify the fact that it is true.12 
Poor countries might decide that, given how the rich have acted in the past and can be expected 
to act in the future, they have prudential reasons for eschewing SDT. But things are very 
different for rich countries. We can ask rich countries to justify their decision to act in the way 
they do when poor countries make use of the options given to them by SDT, and an acceptable 
justification is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
2. Unfairness 
Special and differential treatment is sometimes compared to domestic affirmative action policies 
which require firms and universities to give preferential treatment to applicants from 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Vol. 33, 1999, No. 5, p. 25; and Ethan Kapstein, Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 70-71. 




disadvantaged groups.13 If affirmative action and SDT are comparable, the latter may be 
vulnerable to some of the objections commonly levelled at the former. Let us consider this 
possibility. Perhaps the strongest objection to affirmative action is that it unfairly deprives 
talented individuals of jobs and university places which they would have secured in the absence 
of affirmative action. Those who make this objection sometimes acknowledge that we are not 
dealing with like cases, but maintain that differential treatment is nevertheless unfair. 
 The most obvious analogue to this objection focuses on the effects of SDT on rich 
world firms. These firms will be denied access to certain markets, their developing-world 
competitors will be strengthened, and their economic vitality may well be undermined. We can 
begin to formulate a response to this objection by considering how one should reply to the 
complaint that affirmative action denies talented individuals access to positions which would 
otherwise have been available to them. Notice that this complaint invokes an inappropriate 
counterfactual. The relevant counterfactual consideration is not who would have secured which 
position in a scenario identical to the status quo except for the absence of affirmative action 
policies, but rather who would have secured which position in a scenario in which (i) affirmative 
action policies were never introduced and (ii) where the injustices which motivated those policies 
never occurred. While it is surely true that in a society disfigured by racial injustice certain white 
applicants would be offered jobs and university places which they would not have been offered 
had affirmative action programmes been in operation, it is much less likely that those same 
applicants would have been offered those positions had segregation and other forms of racial 
injustice not incapacitated potential black competitors. 
 Similarly, one might argue that rich-world firms are invoking an inappropriate 
counterfactual when they complain that they are denied opportunities which they would have 
enjoyed if SDT had never been introduced and all other variables had remained the same. The 
                                                          
13 Gillian Moon, “Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover”, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 12, No. 
3, 2009, pp. 622-23; Kapstein, op. cit., p. 70. 
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relevant counterfactual, it can be argued, is how those firms would have fared if (i) SDT had 
never been introduced and (ii) many of their foreign rivals were not operating in countries 
crippled by colonial plunder and the extant machinery of global injustice. If we endorse the 
second of the three positive arguments for SDT adumbrated in the previous subsection – 
according to which rich countries are complicit in the creation and maintenance of world poverty 
– this response is readily available to us. 
 Equally pertinent is the fact that even in a free global market without SDT rich world 
firms would not prosper simply by virtue of being more efficient than their foreign rivals. To the 
degree that rich world firms object to SDT on the grounds that it enables less efficient 
companies based in developing countries to outcompete them in the global market, they are 
betraying their economic ignorance; they may be outdone by their less efficient foreign rivals 
even in the absence of SDT. A firm operating in Country A and Industry P may be more 
efficient than its counterparts in Country B, but the theory of comparative advantage tells us that 
if Country A firms operating in Industry Q are even more efficient vis-à-vis their counterparts in 
Country B, Country A firms in Industry P may well lose out from free trade.14 
In the US, practices such as affirmative action which sanction granting preferential 
treatment to certain groups of citizens are sometimes accused of violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution which guarantees “equal protection of the laws”. SDT practices 
which grant preferential treatment to certain countries, and deviate from MFN, NT, and the 
reciprocity principle, may be conceived of as analogous transgressions. It is thus instructive to 
consider how the US courts have responded to these accusations.15 
                                                          
14 On this point see Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire: Third Edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2009), pp. 33-34. 
15 The following paragraph draws on Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) pp. 412-413. 
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In order to assess claims that a piece of legislation violates the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution, the American courts follow a two stage procedure. The goal of the first stage is 
to establish whether the law in question seriously disadvantages what the Supreme Court has 
referred to as a “suspect class”, namely, a group “saddled with such disabilities, or subject to 
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”16 
If the law seriously disadvantages a suspect class then the purpose of the second stage is to 
subject the law to “strict scrutiny”. If, on the other hand, those disadvantaged by the law do not 
belong to a suspect class, the law is subjected to “relaxed scrutiny”. A law subject to strict 
scrutiny will be regarded as unconstitutional unless the disadvantage it generates can be shown to 
be necessary for the protection of a “compelling” governmental interest. By contrast, a law 
subject to relaxed scrutiny will be regarded as constitutional unless it can be shown to serve no 
purpose whatsoever. 
Suppose we were to assess SDT using a similar procedure. It seems that SDT should 
only be subject to relaxed scrutiny, for the rich world firms it disadvantages clearly do not belong 
to a suspect class. Thus, SDT would be vindicated provided that it could be shown to serve a 
worthwhile end. The positive arguments sketched in the previous subsection each identify 
worthwhile ends – fulfilment of positive duties; fulfilment of rectificatory duties; and equitable 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Consequently, provided one can demonstrate that SDT is 
an effective means of achieving those ends, SDT would be justified.17 
3. Economic Harm 
                                                          
16 Justice Powell, quoted in ibid., p. 412. 
17 When developing countries use SDT measures to restrict imports from countries at a comparable or lower level of 
development such measures assume a more worrying character. Perhaps such uses should be proscribed. On this 
point see Peter Kleen and Sheila Page, “Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World 
Trade Organization”, Global Development Studies, No. 2, 2005, p. 50. 
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As we saw above, it is sometimes claimed that SDT is counter-productive because it diminishes 
the bargaining power of the poor countries it is supposed to help. But SDT is commonly 
criticized on the grounds that it harms the economies of poor countries in a more direct fashion. 
Many economists and policy makers believe that free trade promotes growth and development, 
and they criticize SDT because it permits poor countries to employ protectionist measures which 
undermine their development prospects.18 The relationship between free trade, growth, and 
development is a matter best left to economists, but that does not mean that there is nothing to 
be said here. Rather, we should emphasize that SDT comes in many different varieties. While it 
might be true that free trade promotes development, and that protectionist policies inhibit it, it 
does not follow from such facts that all conceivable forms of SDT will be economically harmful, 
for not all forms of SDT permit developed countries to employ protectionist measures. 
Monetary payments or technology transfers, for example, do not permit or encourage 
protectionism. Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the abstract idea or concept of 
granting special treatment to poor countries, and specific conceptions of that idea which describe 
the form which special treatment should take. While particular conceptions of special treatment 
(e.g. those which permit the use of protectionist measures) might be economically harmful, the 
claim that the concept of special treatment must inevitably be expressed in policies which will 
hurt the interests of developing countries is implausible. 
 This concludes the first section. We have explicated the idea of formal equality, identified 
several arguments for departing from formal equality, and seen how departures in the form of 
                                                          
18 Trade can promote growth through a variety of channels. For example, trade exposes domestic firms to foreign 
competition which gives them a strong incentive to become more efficient: if they do not, they may not survive. 
Trade can also encourage growth by facilitating the transfer of technology and knowledge. Firms in one country are 
made aware of novel production processes and business methods used by firms in other countries, and are thus able 
to become more efficient. And, to take one final example, by expanding the size of the market, trade enables firms 
to take advantage of economies of scale. Some economists think that poor countries would benefit considerably 
from opening their markets, but others disagree. The most well-known, and robust, argument in favour of closure is 
the “infant-industry argument”. Famously defended by John Stuart Mill, this argument maintains that countries can 
benefit from employing protectionist measures in order to nurture new firms which are not ready to compete in the 
global market. Helpful, non-technical, statements of the case for free trade are presented in Stiglitz and Charlton, op. 
cit., Ch. 2, and Irwin, op. cit., Ch. 2. For discussion of the infant industry argument, see Douglas A. Irwin, Against the 
Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Ch. 8. 
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SDT can be defended against a number of objections. I do not claim to have offered a full 
vindication of SDT, but rather to have performed some of the philosophical groundwork that is 
necessary for the achievement of such a vindication. As we have seen, whether any particular 
conception of SDT can be fully vindicated depends upon the resolution of important economic 
questions regarding the efficacy of that conception.  
II 
The Principle of Reciprocity 
The analysis in the previous section did not differentiate between the various expressions of 
formal equality found in the WTO (non-discrimination, reciprocity, etc.) In this section I focus 
on one particular expression of formal equality, namely, the principle of reciprocity. Whereas 
section I defended departures from formal equality by appealing to the needs of developing 
countries, this section reveals that some fairness-based demands for formal equality run into 
trouble even if we bracket those needs. I do, however, appeal to the needs of developing 
countries in order to defeat what I call the “special interest” conception of reciprocity. 
 Reciprocity means different things in different contexts and disciplines. In the study of 
world politics, reciprocity is a characteristic of interstate relations which is said to obtain when all 
parties make roughly equivalent contributions to a shared endeavour. A state behaves 
reciprocally when it acts in a way which is conducive to the achievement of reciprocity, i.e. by 
aiming to match the efforts of others.19 It is this notion of reciprocity which I will be referring to 
throughout this section. This notion of reciprocity is usually conceived of as a strategy for 
                                                          
19 The idea of reciprocity as understood by scholars of International Relations is actually more complex than this. In 
addition to equivalent contributions it also requires that states make their behaviour conditional upon the behaviour 
of others. Moreover, reciprocity is not only a characteristic of cooperative endeavours; a state acts reciprocally when, 
for example, it fires a nuclear weapon at a state which has just fired a nuclear weapon at it. However, the definition 
given in the text is adequate for present purposes. See Robert Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations”, in 
his International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 
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achieving cooperation in an anarchic world order. But it is also sometimes said to be a 
requirement of fairness. 
 In the context of international trade, reciprocity is often regarded as a crucial value. As 
Andrew Brown and Robert Stern point out, in “bilateral trade negotiations, negotiators have 
often directly compared, product by product, the size of the tariff cuts and the volume of trade 
in order to assure themselves of equivalence.”20 This insistence on what has been called specific 
reciprocity has been replaced in recent decades by diffuse reciprocity.21 Brown and Stern observe that 
in recent negotiations among developed countries, a rough sense of equivalence could be perceived to 
have guided them even if there was no close accounting of the gains in market access. In each of 
the major areas of negotiation, the mutual concessions among these countries were roughly 
comparable.22 
It is sometimes said that, in the absence of rough equivalence of concessions, unfairness obtains. 
Indeed, a number of US firms have insisted that fair trade requires nothing less than strict 
equivalence, or specific reciprocity.23 But such claims are insensitive to a highly relevant 
consideration, namely, how liberal each country was at the start of negotiations. If Country A 
enters a round of negotiations with, say, very few tariff barriers, while Country B enters the 
round with very many tariff barriers, it hardly makes sense to say that the outcome of the 
negotiations is unfair simply by virtue of the fact that Country A agreed to fewer tariff reductions 
than Country B. 
If A has a lower level of tariffs because it has made more reductions than B in the past, A 
can rightly insist that those reductions be taken into consideration when measuring each 
                                                          
20 Andrew G. Brown and Robert M. Stern, “Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System”, Pacific Economic 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 300 
21 These terms were coined in Keohane, op. cit., p. 134. Specific reciprocity “refer[s] to situations in which specified 
partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence…” Diffuse reciprocity, by contrast, 
refers to situations in which “the definition of equivalence is less precise…” 
22 Brown and Stern, op. cit., p. 300, emphasis added. 
23 Kenneth W. Abbott, “Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of Section 301”, in Bhagwati and Hudec 
(eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Volume 2 – Legal Analysis, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996) pp. 425-28 
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country’s relative contribution and determining how many reductions each country should make 
in the future. Alternatively, if A has always maintained fewer tariff barriers than B, it can point 
out that, all along, it has offered B greater access to its market. Either way, expecting A to 
commit to the same number of future reductions as B is to demand more of A than of B. B 
might point out that by reducing tariffs by x percent it will incur a certain level of costs, and that 
unfairness obtains unless A commits to reductions which entail costs of a comparable level. But 
A can maintain that it has borne such costs in the past. Moreover, given that B’s market is 
currently more protected than A’s, B has more to gain from liberalization – more precisely, B has 
more to gain from beginning the liberalization process than A does from further liberalization – 
and the costs B incurs can therefore be offset to a greater degree. 
These points have not been lost on many US firms who have been quick to advance an 
alternative conception of reciprocity according to which what matters is not the level of 
concessions made during any given round of negotiations, but rather the relative openness of 
countries’ markets. Proponents of this conception of reciprocity, which has been called the equal 
access conception24, allege that trade is fair when markets in all countries are equally accessible. 
The equal access conception of reciprocity comes in two varieties: national equal access 
reciprocity and sectoral equal access reciprocity.25 According to the former, there must be equal 
access at the national level; the incidence of tariffs and other protectionist measures in one 
country must be no higher than the incidence of protectionist measures in other countries. On 
this view, the distribution of protectionist measures is unimportant. Country A may protect its 
agricultural industry to a greater extent that Country B, but, if Country B protects its textile 
industry to a greater extent than Country A, the demands of equal access reciprocity may 
nevertheless be satisfied. According to sectoral equal access reciprocity, by contrast, the 
distribution of market access must be the same in all countries. If Country B has few agricultural 
                                                          
24 Ibid., pp. 428. 
25 Ibid., pp. 428-435. 
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tariffs while Country A has many, unfairness obtains, irrespective of whether the incidence of 
protectionist measures employed by each country balances out at the national level. 
National equal access reciprocity suffers from a fatal flaw, namely, it is insensitive to the 
fact that access to particular markets is valued differently by different countries. This insensitivity 
means that national equal access reciprocity generates perverse results. For example, it would 
regard as unfair a scenario in which Country A imposes a higher number of tariffs than Country 
B, even if none of the tariffs imposed by A protect industries of particular value to B, and none 
of the tariffs imposed by B protect industries of particular value to A. Conversely, it would 
regard as fair a scenario in which A and B impose the same number of tariffs, but in which A 
protects the industries of greatest value to B while B liberalizes the industries of greatest value to 
A. It is very hard to see how the second scenario could be fairer than the first. (Note that this 
argument does not appeal to the needs of developing countries.) 
The same kinds of consideration that defeat national equal access reciprocity also reveal 
problems for sectoral equal access reciprocity. Suppose that Country A enjoys a comparative 
advantage in the production of Product P, and thus has a special interest in Country B ceasing to 
protect its market for P, while Country B enjoys a comparative advantage in the production of 
Product Q, and thus has a special interest in Country A ceasing to protect its market for Q. Now 
consider two scenarios. In the first scenario both A and B cease to protect their market for P, 
while continuing to protect their market for Q. In the second scenario, by contrast, A ceases to 
protect its market for Q, while continuing to protect its market for P, whereas B ceases to 
protect its market for P, while continuing to protect its market for Q. Sectoral equal access 
reciprocity tells us that the first scenario is fairer than the second. But this result is rather 
puzzling. In the first scenario A gets what it wants, but B does not, while in the second scenario 
both countries get what they want. If either scenario is fairer than the other it is surely the 
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second. (This argument, like the argument offered in the previous paragraph against national 
equal access reciprocity, does not appeal to the needs of developing countries.) 
Sectoral equal access reciprocity faces an additional problem. According to this form of 
reciprocity, if Country A liberalizes a particular industry, Country B is compelled by fairness to 
reciprocate by also liberalizing that industry. But B may have a strong interest in refraining from 
liberalizing that industry, an interest which A lacks. For example, excessive subsidization of 
agriculture in developed countries has led to agricultural overproduction, while inadequate 
support for agriculture in developing countries has led to agricultural underproduction. Thus, 
developing countries have a strong interest, which developed countries lack, in subsidizing 
agriculture. But according to equal access reciprocity, if developed countries liberalize agriculture, 
fairness requires developing countries to follow suit. But this is bizarre. Why would fairness 
require two sets of countries to take the same course of action, when taking that course of action 
is economically sensible for one set but economically disastrous for the other? 
These objections to national and sectoral equal access reciprocity suggest an alternative 
reciprocity principle. According to what we might call special interest reciprocity if Country A 
liberalizes a market of special interest to Country B, fairness requires B to reciprocate by 
liberalizing a market of special interest to A. Against special interest reciprocity it might be 
argued that developed countries are required to liberalize markets of special value to developing 
(or, at least, least developed) countries even if developing countries continue to protect markets 
of special value to developed countries. Such an argument would appeal to one of the rationales 
for SDT that we encountered in the previous section. For example, it could invoke the widely 
endorsed normative premise that if one is in a position to alleviate severe deprivation at little cost 
to oneself then one ought to do so, along with the empirical premises that (i) severe deprivation 
can be alleviated when rich countries liberalize the markets in which poor countries enjoy a 
comparative advantage, and that (ii) rich countries can liberalize those markets without incurring 
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large costs. Premise (i) is widely accepted. Premise (ii) is slightly more controversial. When rich 
countries liberalize an industry, workers employed in that industry suffer as a result of exposure 
to foreign competition. Indeed, if imports substitute for domestically produced goods, many will 
lose their jobs. But, as economists have been keen to stress, these workers can be compensated. 
The national income gains brought about by liberalization can, in principle, be redistributed so 
that everyone benefits.26 
In defence of developed countries only liberalizing markets of special value to developing 
countries on the condition that developing countries reciprocate, one might argue that it is in 
developing countries’ own interest to liberalize their markets, and then add that making 
liberalization conditional in the way described is an effective way of making them do so. But 
arguing that conditional liberalization by developed countries can be an effective tool for getting 
poor countries to help themselves is very different from arguing that there is unfairness when 
poor countries fail to reciprocate liberalizing efforts made by rich countries. Since it is the latter 
argument that would have to be made by proponents of special interest reciprocity, the former 
argument cannot play a role in vindicating special interest reciprocity. 
Moreover, the claim that it is always in the interest of developing countries to liberalize 
their markets is highly controversial. By contrast, the claim that developing countries benefit in 
terms of poverty alleviation when developed countries liberalize the markets in which the former 
enjoy a comparative advantage is, as I have already noted, widely accepted. Thus, one might 
plausibly insist, against special interest reciprocity, that developed countries are required to cease 
                                                          
26 Nicholas Kaldor, “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility”, Economic 
Journal, Vol. 39, 1939. Some people might object to this claim on the grounds that such compensation will inevitably 
be what Robert Goodin has called “ends-displacing” compensation. (Robert E. Goodin, “Theories of 
Compensation”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1989, p. 60.) Ends-displacing compensation amounts to 
“forcibly shifting [people] from one set of plans and projects to another”, and thus compromises individual 
autonomy (pp. 68-69). However, as Goodin notes, there will sometimes be “all sorts of reasons” for or against 
pursuing a particular policy (such as trade liberalization), and the fact that the costs associated with the policy can 
only be offset by ends-displacing compensation is “just one among many” (p. 75). He concludes that “on balance 
we may well decide that it is best to go ahead with the policy” (p. 75). Elaborating, we can say this: provided that 
ends-displacing compensation is sufficiently generous, trade liberalization plus compensation can be tolerable even if 
it compromises autonomy to some degree.  
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protecting markets of special interest to developing (or, at least, least developed) countries, 
irrespective of whether or not those countries are willing to reciprocate, on the grounds that 
doing so is a low cost way of alleviating severe deprivation. 
In this section I have shown how we can reject the claim that the principle of reciprocity 
– whether conceived of as national equal access, sectoral equal access, or special interest 
reciprocity – is a requirement of fair trade. Moreover, I have shown that national and sectoral 
equal access conceptions of reciprocity are vulnerable to damaging objections even when the 
needs of developing countries are set aside. 
III 
Harmonization 
So far we have considered the claim that fair trade requires formal equality in the area of “at-the-
border policies” such as tariffs and quotas. In recent decades it has been claimed that fair trade 
also requires formal equality in the area of “behind-the-border policies”. It has become common 
to claim that, in order for trade to be fair, some subset of the domestic laws or policies of trading 
countries (e.g. labour or environmental laws) must be made more similar, or harmonized. The term 
“harmonization” is somewhat misleading. As David Leebron has observed 
[t]he term “harmonization” is something of a misnomer insofar as it might be regarded as 
deriving from the musical notion of harmony, for it is difference, not sameness, that makes for 
musical harmony … The claim for the harmonization of laws has come to mean something quite 
different – indeed almost the exact opposite of the musical notion of harmony – namely, that 
international trade relations will not run smoothly, or properly, unless the laws and policies of 
different jurisdictions are made more similar.27 
                                                          
27 David W. Leebron, “Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims”, in Bhagwati and 
Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Volume 1 – Economic Analysis, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), p. 43. 
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Calls for harmonization are motivated by a variety of considerations. The claim, for 
example, might be that trade relations will not run “properly” in the sense that they will not run 
efficiently in the absence of harmonization28; or the claim might be that trade relations will not run 
“properly” in the sense that they will not be fair in the absence of harmonization. Of interest to 
us are harmonization claims motivated by a concern for fairness. As Leebron points out, such 
claims are highly prevalent. He writes: 
Recently, claims for harmonization of national laws and policies have been closely linked to 
claims for “fair trade”. The scholarly literature has begun to embrace the notion that 
harmonization is the mechanism by which unfair differences in legal and other regimes are 
eliminated, and the level playing field, the metaphorical symbol of fairness, is restored.29 
Leebron identifies three types of harmonization claim: pure normative harmonization 
claims, pure non-normative harmonization claims, and what we might call mixed harmonization 
claims.30 Pure normative harmonization claims maintain that all countries should adopt policy P 
because P is better, in some regard, than all alternative policies. Pure non-normative 
harmonization claims allege that all countries should adopt the same policy, because doing so is 
necessary to achieve some value (e.g. fairness or efficiency), but do not claim that any particular 
policy is better than any other. All that matters is that countries adopt the same policy; it does not 
matter which policy they adopt. Mixed harmonization claims incorporate both normative and 
non-normative elements. They call for all countries to adopt policy P because (i) the realization 
of some value requires that all countries adopt the same policy, and (ii) P is better, in some 
regard, than all alternative policies. 
                                                          
28 For example, one might point out that the existence of different regulatory requirements in each country can deter 
producers from engaging in international trade. As Leebron writes: “Even where the marginal compliance costs for 
different jurisdictional requirements are low… legal information costs represent an additional fixed cost for each 
jurisdiction that must be recovered from the sales of products in that jurisdiction. In the face of ignorance and 
uncertainty, a producer might be unwilling to undertake the effort to engage in a small number of international 
transactions. In short, every separate legal system to some extent creates a barrier to trade.” Ibid., p. 62. 
29 Ibid., p. 41. 
30 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
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Leebron notes that there is a sense in which pure normative harmonization claims are 
not bona fide harmonization claims. He observes that 
[t]he apparent harmonization claim results only from a truism: every nation should have a law or 
policy x; therefore, all nations should have the same policy. But here the only claim for 
harmonization is that all nations adopt policy x; there is no claim independent of policy x that all 
nations should have the same policy.31 
I will not discuss pure normative harmonization claims in isolation, but I will briefly consider the 
normative aspect of a common mixed harmonization claim. Let us begin, though, by considering 
pure non-normative harmonization claims. To repeat, according to these claims, in order for a 
particular value – in our case, fairness – to be respected, all trading countries must adopt the 
same policy, but it does not matter which policy they adopt because there is no policy the 
adoption of which is any better than any other. The upshot is that unfairness arises when 
Country A pursues policy P while Country B pursues policy Q, or vice versa, even if there is no 
unfairness or injustice inherent in the pursuit of P or the pursuit of Q. 
This might be because fairness requires the realization of goal G, and G can be realized 
either by A and B both pursuing P, or by A and B both pursuing Q, but not by A pursuing P 
while B pursues Q, or vice versa. In the context of international trade, the goal ostensibly sought 
by those who advance fairness-based harmonization claims is invariably a “level playing field”. 
The claim is that unless certain policies are harmonized, firms or workers in one country will 
enjoy an unfair advantage over firms and workers in another. A non-normative fairness-based 
harmonization claim might maintain, for example, that while it is acceptable for A and B to 
implement a set of environmental laws E, or to refrain from implementing E, if A implements E 
while B does not, and if this reduces the production costs faced by firms in B, firms in B are 
given an unfair advantage over firms in A. 
                                                          
31 Ibid., pp. 50-1. 
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Suppose it is claimed that, by virtue of its lower environmental standards, Country B 
taken as a whole enjoys an unfair advantage over Country A taken as a whole. An obvious response 
to this claim is that A can benefit from cheaper imports made possible by B’s lower standards. 
Or suppose it is claimed that all of the firms in A are unfairly disadvantaged by lower standards 
in B. We can respond to this by pointing out that many firms can, and do, move production to 
where standards are lowest. A stronger non-normative harmonization claim would maintain that 
(i) relatively immobile workers in A are unfairly disadvantaged when competition from B forces 
the firms that employ them to lower wages, make layoffs, or move their operations abroad; or (ii) 
non-multinational firms based in A are unfairly disadvantaged when competition from B reduces 
their profits or puts them out of business. But even these claims are problematical because, in 
theory, the national income gains resulting from cheaper imports could be redistributed so as to 
compensate workers and non-multinational firms for the losses they suffer.32 
Still, while A enjoys national income gains as a result of B’s lower standards (e.g. because 
it can purchase cheap imports), B’s income gains might be larger. Is that unfair? When 
attempting to answer this question it is important to notice that while B might benefit more in 
terms of national income, it does not follow that B benefits more overall, for B’s lower standards 
may entail costs which, by virtue of its higher standards, A avoids. Indeed, if, as non-normative 
harmonization claims maintain, it is not impermissible for A to reduce its standards, there must 
be a reason why A chooses to maintain high standards. And one obvious reason is that the 
maintenance of high standards confers certain (non-income) benefits. Suppose the standards in 
question are environmental in character. By retaining high standards, A can benefit from a 
healthier and more pleasant environment. B might enjoy greater income gains, but only by 
sacrificing environmental quality. Thus, while we might be concerned about how much each 
                                                          
32 In practice, of course, compensatory redistribution will often face sizeable political obstacles. Harmonization 
might then be defended on the ground that it is the more practical policy. But this looks implausible. Suppose A 
attempts to achieve harmonization by getting B to raise its standards. What reasons are there for thinking that this 
will be any easier than motivating domestic support for redistribution? Alternatively, suppose A attempts to achieve 
harmonization by lowering its own environmental standards. Clearly this will also encounter fierce resistance. 
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country benefits in relative terms from the policies they pursue, it is not at all obvious that, 
overall, B is better-off. 
Non-normative fairness-based harmonization claims suffer from an additional limitation. 
When workers and firms believe the playing field is uneven, they invariably call upon their 
governments to demand that other countries change their laws. But non-normative harmonization 
claims cannot support these demands because, as we have seen, such claims do not identify one 
set of laws as superior to any other; they simply maintain that unfairness is a consequence of two 
or more countries adopting different, but equally acceptable, laws. Thus, if government A calls 
upon government B to change its laws in order to level the playing field, B can respond by 
insisting that if A is so concerned about levelling the playing field it should change its own laws. 
Let us move on to mixed harmonization claims.33 These claim that fairness requires all 
countries to pursue policy P, rather than policy Q, because (i) the latter is unjust and (ii) would 
give any country pursuing it an advantage over those who do not pursue it which, by virtue of 
the unjustness of Q, would be an unfair advantage. Pure normative (pseudo) harmonization 
claims would also recognize the injustice of a country pursuing Q, but they would not recognize 
the putative unfairness which arises when some countries pursue Q while others pursue P. 
One of the most commonly advanced mixed harmonization claims asserts that 
unfairness occurs when workers and firms in developed countries have to compete with workers 
and firms in poor countries where labour standards and minimum wages are unjustly low or 
non-existent. The fairness of competitive advantages traceable to low labour standards and 
wages has long been challenged. A memorandum circulated at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
– which gave life to the International Labour Organization (ILO) – revealed a concern on the 
                                                          
33 Leebron claims that all harmonization claims motivated by a concern for fairness seem to “be based solely on the 
existence of difference” (i.e. are purely non-normative) (Leebron, p. 66). But, as I hope will become clear in the 
paragraphs that follow, fairness-based harmonization claims do not have to be construed in this way. Nor does it 
seem that those who have advanced fairness-based harmonization claims have understood themselves to be 
advancing purely non-normative claims; for, consider the reference to “oppressive” working conditions in the Peace 
Conference memorandum quoted in the text. 
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part of the British delegation that “any state … which does not carry out a Convention designed 
to prevent oppressive [working] conditions is guilty of manufacturing under conditions which 
create a state of unfair competition in the international market.”34 
Several of the points made in the discussion of non-normative harmonization claims 
apply here too. If it is claimed that, by virtue of their lower labour standards and wages, 
developing countries enjoy an unfair advantage over developed countries, we can respond by 
pointing out that the latter can benefit from cheaper imports made possible by the former’s 
lower standards and wages.35 Similarly, if it is claimed that all rich world firms are unfairly 
disadvantaged by lower standards in developing countries, we can respond by noting that many 
rich world firms can, and do, move production to where standards and wages are lowest. Indeed, 
the desire to attract multinational corporations is one of the things compelling poor countries to 
keep standards and wages low. A stronger claim would be that (i) relatively immobile workers in 
the developed world are unfairly disadvantaged when competition from developing countries 
forces the firms that employ them to lower wages, make layoffs, or move their operations 
abroad; or (ii) non-multinational firms based in the developed world are unfairly disadvantaged 
when competition from developing countries reduces their profits or puts them out of business. 
But, again, the national income gains resulting from cheaper imports could, in theory, be 
redistributed so as to compensate workers and non-multinational firms for the losses they 
suffer.36 
Still, when addressing this particular harmonization claim the fundamental question is 
whether the toleration of lower labour standards by developing country governments, and their 
refusal to implement or enforce satisfactory (or any) minimum wage laws, is actually unjust. If it 
is not, the harmonization claim collapses because one of its premises is revealed to be false. Is 
                                                          
34 Quoted in Virginia A. Leary, “Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, 
U.S. Laws)”, in Bhagwati and Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Volume 2 – Legal Analysis (Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1996), p. 186. 
35 Leebron, op. cit., p. 60. 
36 Ibid., pp. 60-1. 
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the toleration of lower labour standards by developing country governments unjust? This is a 
difficult question, and it is not feasible to provide a wholly satisfactory answer here, but I can 
show that there are reasons to doubt that the answer will inevitably be affirmative. 
Intuitively, the injustice of subsistence wages and miserable working conditions seems 
hard to deny. But one is given pause by the argument, often advanced by economists, that 
“sweatshop labour” can play a crucial role in an effective strategy of poverty alleviation.37 No 
doubt this argument is often invoked disingenuously by reactionary apologists for the status quo, 
but that is no reason to dismiss it. The argument runs roughly as follows. The lower production 
costs which come with lower wages and standards enable developing world firms to compete 
more effectively in the global market, and also to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Foreign 
companies bring with them investment capital, cutting-edge technology, and advanced business, 
management, and marketing techniques. They provide their employees with valuable training, 
which they can take with them if they move to a different firm, and sometimes give technical and 
financial assistance to local contractors in order to enable them to meet the higher standards of 
foreign companies. This package of goods, it is argued, helps promote growth and reduce 
poverty.38 
If it is to stand any chance of vindicating the use of sweatshop labour, this argument 
cannot simply claim that low wages and standards are one sufficient means among several for 
reducing poverty. Rather, the claim must be one of the following: (1) sweatshop labour is strictly 
necessary for poverty reduction, in the sense that poverty reduction would be literally impossible 
without it; (2) poverty reduction strategies which do not rely upon sweatshop labour are 
available, but they are morally inferior (because, say, they are much less effective, and would 
prolong the plight of the poor, or because they would violate the rights of others (imagine a 
                                                          
37 See, for example, Paul Krugman, “In Praise of Cheap Labor: Bad Jobs at Bad Wages Are Better Than No Jobs At 
All” in his The Accidental Theorist And Other Dispatches from the Dismal Science, (New York: Norton & Company, 1998). 
38 For a helpful review of the literature on the effects of FDI in developing countries see Stephen D. Cohen, 
Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment: Avoiding Simplicity, Embracing Complexity (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), Ch. 8. 
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government which seeks to alleviate domestic poverty by invading other countries and enslaving 
their citizens)); or (3) morally satisfactory alternatives exist, but the unjust behaviour of third 
parties renders them unavailable. (1) is undoubtedly false, but (2) and (3) are both much more 
plausible. 
If it is reasonable for the governments of poor countries to believe that (2) or (3) are 
true, it is not obvious that it would be unjust for them to tolerate sweatshop labour. To be sure, 
patent injustices may have occurred along the way. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which 
(1) or (2) is true, but in which they were made true by unjust actions. And if (3) is true, it is 
unjust that others have acted in a way which has foreclosed the pursuit of strategies less 
burdensome to the global poor. 
Nevertheless, if a government in the developing world reasonably believes that 
conditions (2) or (3) hold, a strong case can be made for the claim that their toleration of 
sweatshop labour is permissible, and perhaps even required. It can be argued that under such 
conditions, toleration of sweatshop labour is the least awful means with which developing world 
governments can enable their severely poor citizens to acquire the resources required to meet 
their most basic needs. Under such conditions, the argument continues, a developing world 
government would do its poorest citizens no favours by prohibiting sweatshops. Such a 
prohibition would simply deny them an opportunity which they may find more appealing than 
the other options available to them, such as scavenging for food on landfill sites.39 
If the toleration of sweatshop labour by developing countries is consistent with justice, 
the common mixed harmonization claim that we have been considering collapses. It does not 
follow from this that any costs imposed upon workers or firms in the developed world by global 
                                                          
39 Debra Satz makes a similar point about child labour: “bans on all child labor may drive families to choose even 
worse options for their children. Children … are presumably better off working in factories than as prostitutes or 
soldiers.” See Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), p. 163. 
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free markets are fair; the corollary is simply that one cannot defend the claim that those costs are 
unfair by claiming that the toleration of sweatshop labour by poor countries is unjust.40 
IV 
In this paper I have sought to cast doubt on the claim that formal equality is a requirement of 
fair trade. Section I began by noting that the standard equity-based argument for formal equality 
does not fare well in the context of trade. I then moved on to show how preferential treatment 
for developing countries can be argued for and defended against a number of objections. Next, 
in section II, I demonstrated how to reject the claim that the principle of reciprocity – which 
requires states to match the liberalization efforts of others – should be regarded as a requirement 
of fairness. Finally, in section III, I examined and criticized a more recent interpretation of 
formal equality in trade, according to which some subset of the laws or policies of trading 
countries should be harmonized.41 
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40 It is worth noting that the mixed harmonization claim that we have been considering is arguably the most 
intuitively compelling mixed harmonization claim. The conviction that sweatshop labour is intolerable will surely 
feature as a provisional fixed-point in the reasoning of many readers. Other mixed harmonization claims have less 
intuitive force. See, for example, Aaron James’s discussion of intellectual property harmonization in op. cit., Ch. 9. 
41 For valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Simon Caney, David Miller, Stuart White, 
and two anonymous reviewers. For helpful discussion I am indebted to the members of the Nuffield Political 
Theory Workshop. 
